GORDON BAKER’S LATE INTERPRETATION OF WITTGENSTEIN

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Gordon Baker and I had been colleagues at St John’s for almost ten years when we resolved, in 1976, to undertake the task of writing a commentary on Wittgenstein’s *Philosophical Investigations*. We had been talking about Wittgenstein since 1969, and when we cooperated in writing a long critical notice on the *Philosophical Grammar* in 1975 (much of which we were later to repudiate⁴), we found that working together was mutually instructive, intellectually stimulating and great fun. We thought that we still had much to say about Wittgenstein’s philosophy, and it seemed to us that misinterpretations of passages in the *Investigations* were so extensive that it would be worth trying to write a detailed analytical commentary. It is difficult to recapture the excitement of those early days in being among the first to work on the microfilms and, subsequently, on the photocopies of Wittgenstein’s *Nachlass*. We spent many hundreds of hours poring over the typescripts and the often only semi-legible manuscripts, fascinated and privileged to be able to try to follow the development of the thoughts of a great philosophical genius. We talked endlessly about what we had found in Wittgenstein’s manuscripts and typescripts, and debated how it should be understood. The first fruit of our labours was *Wittgenstein – Understanding and Meaning* (1980). Its guiding idea was to draw attention to the manner in which Wittgenstein linked the concepts of meaning, understanding and explanation, and so to bypass the connections between meaning, truth and truth-conditions that so fascinated philosophers of the 1970s, and to abandon the red-herring of assertion-conditions and anti-realism.

After a hiatus of four years, during which time we wrote a controversial book entitled *Frege – Logical Excavations* and a polemical book on contemporary philosophy of language – *Language, Sense

¹ Published in *Mind* LXXXV (1976), it was written under the influence of the idea that Wittgenstein’s conception of meaning was a form of anti-realist, assertion-conditions semantics. This we later came to think was completely mistaken. We rewrote our essay comprehensively when Stuart Shanker asked us whether he could reprint it in his four-volume anthology of papers *Ludwig Wittgenstein: critical assessments* (Croom Helm, London, 1986), see vol. i, pp. 323-51.
and Nonsense, we returned to complete our work on the Commentary. We found that although we had initially thought that we could do the job in two volumes, the argument of Investigations §§185-242 was so complex and controversial that it required a volume in its own right. So we wrote Wittgenstein – Rules, Grammar and Necessity (1985). This second volume did, I think, contribute to the clarification of Wittgenstein’s discussion of following a rule. It also attempted to shed fresh light on his philosophy of logic and mathematics in a 70-page essay on grammar and necessity.

During these years we gave graduate seminars together on Friday afternoons in St John’s. These were popular among the graduate students of the day, and it was here that we first aired our various heresies relative to the prevalent orthodoxies, with respect to both the interpretation of Wittgenstein and (later) Frege and to current philosophy of language. Exciting and sometimes impassioned arguments were flung across the table, although good humour and merriment generally prevailed. It was here that our first clashes with Michael Dummett took place, when he attended our early seminars on Frege’s logic. These, alas, later developed into an increasingly acrimonious exchange of papers in the journals.

After completing the second volume of the Commentary, we turned to compose a volume of essays that would incorporate some of the papers we had written together, as well as new material on Wittgenstein and Frege. It was while working on this joint project that I was awarded a British Academy senior research fellowship to work on the third volume of the Commentary. We had hoped to finish the volume of essays before the October 1985 deadline when I had to take up the fellowship, but Gordon had not yet completed his contribution, and I had to start alone on what was to become Wittgenstein – Meaning and Mind. I had been working on this for a year, showing Gordon everything I had written, to be sure, and getting the benefit of his criticisms, when disagreement broke out between us over two essays I had written on thinking. The disagreement spread rapidly to its source in a much deeper emergent disagreement over Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy and philosophical method. Gordon’s views had changed from the shared conception that we had advanced in Wittgenstein –

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Understanding and Meaning, and it proved impossible to reconcile our now radically diverging positions. Unlike local disagreements, this one was impossible to bracket, since it affected everything that had been and that needed to be done. This signalled the parting of our ways – sadly, since we had written five books and numerous articles together, our joint graduate seminars had been immensely enjoyable, and I had learnt a great deal from our cooperative work. Gordon continued to work on the volume of essays, which I now abandoned. The result of this was his highly illuminating book Wittgenstein, Frege and the Vienna Circle, which broke much new ground (and in which the growing philosophical and methodological disagreements between us are barely visible, if at all). In the meantime, I pushed on with Volume 3.

However, after Wittgenstein, Frege and the Vienna Circle, his disagreement with me and with our previous collaborative writings became more prominent and public in his writings. If one examines his essays on Wittgenstein from 1991 onwards, one finds increasing opposition to the interpretations we had given to Wittgenstein’s philosophy in the first two volumes of our Commentary and to the interpretations I offered in Volumes 3 and 4 and in the epilogue, Wittgenstein’s Place in Twentieth-Century Analytic Philosophy. In a series of papers written over ten years, collected in his posthumously published Wittgenstein’s Method – neglected aspects, he advanced a quite different view of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. He made dramatic claims for his new interpretation. The reception of Wittgenstein among Anglophone philosophers, he declared, ‘constitutes an obstacle which continues to interfere with our profiting from the richness of the legacy of the Investigations’ (p. 118). If we could surrender the preconception that Wittgenstein was practising conceptual analysis, he wrote, ‘we might...”

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4 He added the clause ‘as this phrase is now understood’, but left it opaque how he thought it to be then understood or what other licit ways there were of understanding it. On p. 179 he added that in many respects, the therapeutic method ‘is radically different from established procedures of conceptual analysis in analytic philosophy’. On p. 217 he made it clear that he took Wittgenstein’s method to be ‘very far removed from the paradigms of “conceptual analysis” to be found in Carnap and Ryle’. That Wittgenstein’s later methods were very far removed from Carnap’s is uncontroversial. That they are very far removed from Ryle’s forms of conceptual analysis is more debatable – see below.
find that his work had more to teach us than we ever dreamt of’ (p. 85). His interpretations, according to his own view, call for ‘radical re-evaluation of the methods of concept-clarification exhibited in the whole corpus of Wittgenstein’s writings’ (p. 92f.). For Wittgenstein’s method, contrary to the views of ‘soi-disant Wittgensteinians’ (p. 276), has more affinities with Nietzsche’s and Merleau-Ponty’s methods5 (pp. 222n. 43, 277) than with analytic philosophers such as Ryle (pp. 116, 181f., 217).

I find myself in disagreement with Gordon’s late interpretations of Wittgenstein in *Wittgenstein’s Method*. He was a reflective philosopher, bustling with ideas, and a keen student of Wittgenstein’s thought. So his late understanding of Wittgenstein deserves the same serious consideration and critical examination that he himself gave to philosophers he respected but disagreed with. I shall try to explain why his psychoanalytic, therapeutic interpretation of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy seems to me to be deeply mistaken.

**Baker’s new conception**

Gordon Baker’s interpretation of Wittgenstein’s methods is akin to Bouwsma’s, Farrell’s and Lazerowitz’s, and has affinities with the methods adopted by John Wisdom. It characterizes Wittgenstein’s philosophy as a form of philosophical psycho-analysis. There is, according to Baker, not merely an analogy between Wittgenstein’s method and Freud’s, but rather, as he claims Waismann showed, the conception of philosophical method is *modelled* on that of psychoanalysis. It presupposes ‘reconceptualizing the boundary between logic and psychology’ (p. 219). On Wittgenstein’s / Waismann’s view, ‘dealing with compulsions, obsessions, prejudices, torments, ... is the proper business of philosophy’ (ibid.). Indeed, a therapeutic philosopher (such as Wittgenstein) ‘has no business with anybody who is not suffering intellectual disquiet, torment, despair, distress, etc.’ (p. 173, n. 12), for ‘suffering is the presupposition of “our method”’, which is ‘inapplicable to anybody unaffected by intellectual torment’ (p. 184). Wittgenstein’s method, according to Baker, is characterized by the

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5 Although the only affinity mentioned is that they were all concerned to combat prejudices and superstitions.
following distinctive features:

1. It is primarily therapeutic, on the Freudian model (pp. 68, 178, 218). ‘Wittgenstein’s enterprise has closer affinities with sessions of psycho-therapy’ than with Rylean analytic philosophy (p. 145).

2. It is essentially person-relative (pp. 68, 217) and patient-specific (p. 163). So it is not concerned with combating general schools or styles of thought, such as dualism or behaviourism in philosophy of mind, or Platonism or Intuitionism in philosophy of mathematics (p. 68), but only with the intellectual neuroses of specific individuals. The *Philosophical Investigations* might better be viewed as a set of case histories of a GP (pp. 68, 132). Wittgenstein always sought ‘to address specific problems of definite individuals’ (p. 68), and to ‘treat’ these individuals. He never ‘advocated any general positive position’ (p. 68) nor undertook to give ‘any general outline of the logical geography’ of any part of our grammar (ibid.). His enterprise was concerned only with the treatment of specific individuals suffering from a peculiar form of intellectual torment (pp. 182f.).

3. The responsibility for philosophical confusion, like the responsibility for psycho-analytic disorder, is shifted to the patient. The ultimate goal of Wittgenstein’s method is to show how to bring to consciousness our own individual intellectual prejudices, drives, compulsions. The method is essentially dialogue, a face-to-face ‘talk-cure’ (p. 164). So it aims at self-knowledge and self-understanding, and its goal is the enhancement of individuals’ freedom of thought (p. 200), or of human welfare (p. 218).

4. Philosophical discussion ‘is less a matter of constructing rigorous arguments from secure premisses than of making propaganda for alternative points of view’ (p. 219). There is no attempt to assemble a dossier of grammatical facts, and no attempt to frame adversarial, coercive arguments (p. 217).

5. Since the source of philosophical torment is above all ‘pictures’, and since one (allegedly) cannot combat a picture with an argument, proper philosophical method consists in offering alternative pictures to those who are afflicted. Hence ‘In each case, [Wittgenstein] puts before us a picture in order
to bring about a change in our manner of seeing something, and instead of making an assertion, he does nothing more than say “Look at this” (cf. PI §144)” (p. 137).

What is the evidence for this interpretation? First, Baker claims that ‘There was a definite phase of Wittgenstein’s thinking in which close comparison with Freud’s methods informed his own conception of philosophical investigation. This phase extended over several years, at least from the composition of The Big Typescript to the writing of PPI [TS 220 (the Early Draft)]’ (p. 155). This evidence, therefore is in Wittgenstein’s own writings.

Second, he avers, Waismann, in ‘How I See Philosophy’ ‘offered a fully developed conception of philosophical therapy expressly modelled on the features of Freudian psychotherapy’ (p. 146), which represents the way Wittgenstein thought about philosophy and philosophical method in the early 1930s, and arguably later too (pp. 179, 201n.3). This evidence, therefore, lies in Waismann’s essay and Wittgenstein’s dictations to Waismann in the early thirties (p. 155). Strikingly, Baker alleges that ‘the whole of “How I See Philosophy” can be seen as an elaboration of Wittgenstein’s remark “Our method is similar in certain respects to psychoanalysis”’ (p. 181). We shall examine these claims below.

It seems to me that Baker’s late conception of Wittgenstein’s methods was unduly influenced by the work he did on the Waismann papers. I think that he misrepresents Waismann’s position and its relation to Wittgenstein’s. And I think that he misrepresents Wittgenstein’s methodology both in the early 1930s and later. I shall try to substantiate this in the next three sections.

Waismann and Wittgenstein

Baker spent many years editing Waismann’s notes of Wittgenstein’s dictations.⁶ He also worked with Brian McGuinness on Logik, Sprache, Philosophie – the German edition of Waismann’s book The Principles of Linguistic Philosophy, which was based on the Wittgenstein dictations – and he evidently spent much time reflecting on Waismann’s 1956 essay ‘How I See Philosophy’. All this coloured

⁶ This dedicated labour resulted in the posthumous publication of The Voices of Wittgenstein (Routledge, London and New York, 2003).
Baker’s late essays on Wittgenstein. This is evident in three features.

(i) He attributed greater weight to the Waismann dictations than they merit. It seems to have been part of his exegetical method to take the dictations to be authoritative expressions of Wittgenstein’s later views unless expressly repudiated.

This is methodologically unsound. First, Wittgenstein never refined or approved of the dictations. Given the extent to which he worked over his own notes and typescripts, it is perilous to assume that the ‘voices of Wittgenstein’ that can be heard in the dictations are voices that he would uniformly be willing to acknowledge as expressing his definitive view. Secondly, the dictations were given principally in the years 1931 to 1934/5, i.e. roughly contemporaneously with *The Big Typescript* and its revisions. Although many remarks from *The Big Typescript* were to be incorporated in the *Investigations*, it must be remembered that he was not satisfied with most of them, and revised the material ceaselessly before making his final selections from it. It is more than merely unlikely that he would have been satisfied with unrevised dictations made at the same time. I am, of course, not suggesting that the dictations are worthless as source material – only that they should be used with caution, and that greater weight be given to Wittgenstein’s own typescripts and especially to his notes and typescripts of the later thirties and forties.7

(ii) Not only are the dictations not authoritative, but Waismann’s *Logik, Sprache, Philosophie* is not either. It is noteworthy that what apparently precipitated Wittgenstein’s decision to publish his later ideas in 1938 was the knowledge that Waismann was lecturing in Cambridge on the basis of the draft of the former text.8 Hence the 1938 Preface: ‘Until a short time ago I had really given up the idea of publishing these remarks in my lifetime. But the idea has been revived mainly by the fact that I have

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7 Similar caution must be exercised with respect to students’ notes of Wittgenstein’s lectures. Drury reports his saying to a student who was taking comprehensive notes during his lectures ‘If you write these spontaneous remarks down, some day someone will publish them as my considered opinions. I don’t want that done. For I am talking freely now as my ideas come, but all this will need a lot more thought and better expression.’ M. O’C. Drury, ‘Conversations with Wittgenstein’, in R. Rhea ed. *Ludwig Wittgenstein – Personal Recollections* (Blackwell, Oxford, 1981), p. 155.

been obliged to learn that the results of my work, which I had communicated orally, in lectures and discussions, more or less mangled or watered down, were in circulation’ (TS 225). This, to be sure, does not mean that the book is not an important derivative source; what it means is that it must be used cautiously and may not be treated as authoritative unless it confirms Wittgenstein’s views as expressed by himself in later years. If it conflicts with his later views, it is they that must be respected. If it pronounces on a matter of importance on which he is later silent, it should be treated with great circumspection. (It is, after all, more than merely improbable that the key to Wittgenstein’s later methodology is not even mentioned in the Philosophical Investigations.)

(iii) Baker assumes that the methodological views Waismann expressed in ‘How I See Philosophy’ were Wittgenstein’s own. ‘The vision of philosophy that Waismann elaborated in 1956’, he wrote, ‘seems to have been Wittgenstein’s own at least in the early 1930s. ... it is a description of a very distinctive method which appears to have dominated Wittgenstein’s work at this period’ (p. 179), and added in a footnote ‘Arguably it continued to dominate Wittgenstein’s later work’ (p. 201n. 3). This is mistaken. By 1956, Waismann had come to detest Wittgenstein and everything he thought he stood for. He referred to him in conversation with Heinrich Neider as ‘the greatest disappointment of his life’, accused him of an anti-scientific attitude, and even of ‘complete obscurantism’. He wrote of him, in one of his aphorisms, ‘Wittgenstein – the leading thinker of our day: namely, the one leading to falsehood’. ‘How I See Philosophy’, although obviously hugely influenced by Wittgenstein, was written to distance Waismann from Wittgenstein, not to reiterate his views. This is demonstrable by a few examples.

(a) No great discoverer, Waismann wrote (HISP 16), ‘has acted in accordance with the motto “Everything that can be said can be said clearly” ... For my part, I’ve always suspected that clarity is the last refuge of those who have nothing to say.’ Yet Wittgenstein was not only the author of this ‘motto’, but also wrote ‘For me, by contrast [with the scientific, progressive spirit of western civilization] clarity,

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10 ‘Wittgenstein – der führende Denker unserer Zeit (nämlich der ins Falsche führende).’
perspicuity, are ends in themselves’ (MS 109, 207), and ‘the clarity we are aiming at is indeed complete clarity’ (PI §133).

(b) Philosophy, Waismann averred, is ‘not only criticism of language’, for thus construed, its aim is too narrow. This remark is probably directed against Tractatus 4.0031: ‘All philosophy is a “critique of language”’. Maybe the later Wittgenstein would not have repeated his youthful remark, but not for the reason Waismann gave: namely, that what is essential to philosophy is, above all, vision (HISP p. 32) – a theme that does not occur in Wittgenstein’s reflections on philosophy.

c) In a patent anti-Wittgensteinian sarcasm, Waismann remarked: ‘To ask “What is your aim in philosophy?” and to reply “To show the fly the way out of the flybottle” is ... well, honour where it is due, I suppress what I was going to say’ (HISP p. 32).

d) Philosophers, Waismann wrote, have to ‘undermine current categories’ ... ‘question the canons of satisfactoriness themselves’; ‘philosophy is the re-testing of standards’; ‘In every philosopher lives something of the reformer’ (HISP p. 33). This contrasts sharply with Wittgenstein, who held that ‘Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of language’, that ‘It leaves everything [in grammar] as it is’ (PI §124), that its task is to clarify existing categories, not replace them with different ones.

e) ‘To say that metaphysics is nonsense is nonsense’, Waismann wrote, ‘Metaphysicians, like artists, are the antennae of their time.’ This too is intentionally asserted in the face of Wittgenstein’s persistent averral that metaphysics is nonsense – a confusion of conceptual with empirical questions, and a projection of grammar (actual or notional) on to reality.

It is equally disconcerting that Baker reads into Waismann’s essay things that are not to be found there at all, and, then proceeds to ascribe them to Wittgenstein. Baker claims that ‘In How I See Philosophy’ Waismann ‘offered a fully developed conception of philosophical therapy expressly modelled on certain features of Freudian psychotherapy. He was explicit about what he understood by the maladies addressed by psychotherapy (compulsions, obsessions, neuroses) and about what methods are appropriate for their treatment. (His text suggests that he had in view primarily Freud’s early
It is, however, noteworthy that neither the word ‘psychoanalysis’ nor any of its cognates even occurs in Waismann’s essay, nor is Freud mentioned.\footnote{Equally, it is noteworthy that in the voluminous dictations of Voices of Wittgenstein there is only one mention of the psychoanalytic analogy (p. 69), namely in the Diktat f ür Schlick, in which it was a deleted paragraph, evidently derived from MS 109, 174.} Waismann does not in fact offer psychoanalysis as a model for philosophical method at all.\footnote{In Baker’s essays ‘Thinking about thinking’ (1997) and ‘A vision of philosophy’ (1999), reprinted in Wittgenstein’s Method, this fact is not mentioned. He does mention it in his posthumously published essay ‘Friedrich Waismann: How I See Philosophy’ (Philosophy 78 (2003), 163-79). On the opening page there, Baker notes for the first time that Waismann mentions neither Freud nor psychoanalysis, but, Baker avers, Waismann delineates a ‘distinctive form of intellectual therapy’, which ‘from independent evidence (PLP 179) we know he thought to have some striking resemblances with psychoanalysis’. Baker then repeats much the same points that are in the previous two articles. If we turn to The Principles of Linguistic Philosophy, we find that Waismann remarks only that ‘Our method is in certain respects similar to that of psychoanalysis’ in bringing unconscious analogies to consciousness (p. 179), and adds (rightly) ‘this comparison could be carried further’. But what he does not say, pace Baker, is that Freudian psychoanalytic therapy provides not an analogy but a model for philosophical method.} True, he writes of ‘deep disquietude’ (HISP 3), ‘alarm’ or even ‘terror, accompanied by slight giddiness’ at Augustine’s puzzle of how time can possibly be measured (HISP 3f.), of ‘mental discomfort’ (HISP 6), ‘states of confusion’ generated by Zeno’s paradox (HISP 7), ‘obsessional doubt’ about other minds and ‘anxiety doubt’ about freedom of the will (HISP 8), and speaks of Frege’s ‘obsession with the question ‘What is a number?’ (HISP 19). But he never connects this hyperbole with psychoanalysis or even suggests that psychoanalytic method is a revolutionary model for philosophy.

Having insisted that there are no deductive proofs or inductive confirmation in philosophy, Waismann was eager to stress that this does not mean that there are no rational arguments in philosophy. So what is the philosopher up to? Waismann does offer us a model – and it is a legal, not a psychoanalytic one; and it is not one of combating pictures with pictures. The philosopher, he wrote, builds up a case.\footnote{Baker castigated ‘soi-disant analytic philosophers’ for having ‘a definite ideal of philosophical argument, as case building’, which they misguidedly impute to Wittgenstein (p. 269). If so, then Waismann shared the same ‘definite ideal’.}

First he makes you see all the weaknesses, disadvantages, shortcomings of a position; he brings to light inconsistencies in it or points out how unnatural some of the ideas underlying the whole theory are by pushing them...
to their farthest consequences; and this he does with the strongest weapons in his arsenal, reduction to absurdity and infinite regress. On the other hand, he offers you a new way of looking at things not exposed to those objections. In other words, he submits to you, like a barrister, all the facts of his case and you are in the position of a judge. You look at them carefully, weigh the pros and cons and arrive at a verdict. (HISP 30)

The legal analogy, to be sure, is Waismann’s, not Wittgenstein’s. The point is that this is the sole explicit model for the methods of philosophy in ‘How I See Philosophy’, and it is very far removed from the psychoanalytic model that Baker read into Waismann’s paper.

Wittgenstein on the psychoanalytic analogy

Did Wittgenstein really think that psychoanalysis provided a model for his method of philosophizing? Did this idea really ‘dominate’ his work in the early 1930s (p. 179), and arguably even his later work (p.201 n.3)? Certainly in the early 1930s he thought that there was an analogy between his methods and Freud’s. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that in the Nachlass there are only five distinct remarks on the matter (though most are repeated when copied into large MS volumes, and in TSS).

(i) One is, through mistaken grammar, inclined to ask: how does one think the proposition \( p \), how does one expect such-and-such to happen (how does one do it). Such mistaken questions contain in nuce the whole difficulty. It is a main task of philosophy to warn against false comparisons, false similes that underlie our modes of expression without our being conscious of them. ‘I believe’, Wittgenstein continues, ‘that our method is similar here to that of psychoanalysis that also makes the unconscious conscious and renders it thereby harmless, and I think that the similarity is not merely external’ (MS 109, 174).

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(ii) MS 110, 230 contains an early draft of BT 410. I give the polished version:

One of the most important tasks is to express all false trains of thought so characteristically that the reader says, “Yes, that’s exactly the way I meant it”. To trace the physiognomy of every error.

Indeed we can only convict someone else of a mistake if he acknowledges that this really is the expression of his feeling. // ... if he (really) acknowledges this expression as the correct expression of his feeling. //

For only if he acknowledges it as such is it the correct expression. (Psychoanalysis.)

What the other person acknowledges is the analogy I am proposing to him as the source of his thought.

In *The Big Typescript*, this occurs under the chapter heading ‘Philosophy shows the misleading analogies in the use of language’. This passage was incorporated into MS 142, §121 in 1936/7, and typed into TS 220, §106. It does not, however, occur in the Intermediate Draft or in the *Investigations*. It is noteworthy, however, that a similar thought is expressed in the *Investigations* §254, stripped of any psychoanalytic association: we do sometimes have to give a psychologically accurate account of the temptation to use a particular kind of expression. What we ‘are tempted to say’ is not philosophy, but its raw material ... something for philosophical treatment.

(iii) In MS 113, 117r (MS 158, 68r), Wittgenstein observes that a mathematician will be horrified by his mathematical comments, since he has been trained to avoid indulging in such thoughts and doubts. To use an analogy from psychoanalysis (this paragraph is reminiscent of Freud, Wittgenstein notes), he has acquired a revulsion from them as infantile. Whereas Wittgenstein demands clarification of all the repressed doubts and difficulties that a child learning arithmetic is trained to pass over. This recurs in *The Big Typescript* (cf. PG 381f.).

(iv) There is a curious aside in MS 145, 58: “‘Meaning has a direction, which no mere process has.” (One could almost say: “Meaning moves, where any process stands still.” (Psychoanalysis of grammatical misinterpretations.)’

(v) In his notes for his lectures in 1938, Wittgenstein jotted down (MS 158, 34v):
What we do is much more akin to Psychoanalysis than you might be aware of

Schopenhauer: “If you find yourself stumped trying to convince someone // of something // and not getting anywhere, tell yourself that it’s the will & not the intellect you’re up against.”

The only other relevant passage that I have been able to find is in the *Diktat für Schlick* in which there occurs a deleted paragraph in the context of the brief discussion of Heidegger on how nothingness noths. This is derived from MS 109, 174 and adds nothing to it.16

That is the sum total of Wittgenstein’s remarks on the affinity of his methods to psychoanalysis. The topic is not even mentioned in the *Investigations* (although the ideas of ‘diseases’ of thought (§593), ‘treatment’ (§§254-5) and ‘therapies’ (PI §133) are).17

So, what are we to make of these few remarks? Do we have here the hidden secret of Wittgenstein’s method? I think not. There are important analogies between some features of Wittgenstein’s methodology and psychoanalytic methods.18 These struck Wittgenstein in the early 1930s, and he repeated them (only very occasionally) until 1938. The analogies are limited. On the basis of Wittgenstein’s remarks alone, there can be no warrant in claiming that what we have is a ‘very distinctive method which appears to have dominated Wittgenstein’s work’ in the early 1930s – not an analogy, but a ‘revolutionary programme’ (p. 179). Moreover, it is not merely that Wittgenstein did not repeat the psychoanalytic analogy in the *Investigations*, we know that he was furious when it was attributed to him.

In 1946 Ayer gave a talk on the BBC on contemporary philosophy. He made a facetious remark about the *Tractatus* conception of the role of the philosopher (‘a park keeper whose business it is to see that no one commits any intellectual nuisance: the nuisance in question being that of lapsing into

16 I exclude the remark on the ‘dynamic theory of the proposition’ (analogous to Freud’s ‘dynamic’ theory of dreams) in TS 220, §93 (cf. TS226, §113 and TS 239, §109), since it refers to the *Tractatus’* account of the proposition, not to a methodological analogy in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy.

17 But one might quite legitimately see an analogy between rendering latent nonsense patent (PI §464) and psychoanalysis, although Wittgenstein does not use the terms ‘latent’ and ‘patent’, and does not draw the analogy in this remark.

metaphysics’). He added that the effect of Wittgenstein’s later teaching on his more ardent disciples ‘has been that they tend to treat philosophy as a department of psychoanalysis’, mentioning in this connection John Wisdom, whose work Ayer described as ‘of fascinating subtlety’, while expressing doubts whether curing intellectual cramps was all that the philosopher was good for. Wittgenstein, Ayer reported, was ‘extremely vexed’, not because of the rude comment about the *Tractatus*, but ‘because of my suggestion that John Wisdom’s view of philosophy could be taken as a pointer to his own. In particular, he did not admit any kinship between the practice of psychoanalysis and his own methods of dealing with philosophical confusions.’19 Doubtless the claim that there is no kinship is exaggerated. But it is noteworthy that Wittgenstein had apparently come to think that the analogy is more harmful than useful,20 and therefore suppressed it in his writings and teachings, since it can evidently lead to such excesses as Wisdom’s. It seems to me that Baker’s interpretation of Wittgenstein’s methods would have been similarly rejected.

What remains in the *Investigations* is the therapeutic method, which is mentioned twice: first in stressing that there are many philosophical methods, just as there are different therapies (PI §133), and later in the suggestion that ‘The philosopher treats a question; like a disease’ (PI §255). In addition, Wittgenstein uses the metaphor of a philosophical ‘disease’ that is rooted in a one-sided diet of examples (PI §593). There is nothing further to be found in the *Nachlass* on therapy, but the medical analogy between philosophical problems and philosophical confusion, on the one hand, and diseases and illnesses, on the other, is common. But it is important to note that the seemingly insoluble philosophical problems are conceived to be ‘diseases’ of the intellect that have their seat in the form of representation (MS 115, 110) – not in the weaknesses of individuals. ‘Our problems’, Wittgenstein wrote in the mid-thirties, ‘... are linguistic errors // are disquietudes that arise from the essence, the depths, of our

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20 As indeed, by 1946, he had come to think that Freud’s ‘fantastic pseudo-explanations’ had done more harm than good (MS 133, 11v).
language // linguistic expressions/.’ (MS 157a, 52v). Far from these ‘diseases of the understanding’ being exclusively person- (or patient-) specific, as Baker claims (pp. 68, 163, 217f.), they are, Wittgenstein suggested in 1946, either rooted in the very nature of language itself or characteristic of our civilization:

Have we to do with mistakes and difficulties that are as old as language? Are they, so to speak, diseases that are bound up with the use of a language, or are they of a more special nature, characteristic of our civilization?

Or also: Is the pre-occupation with the medium of language that runs through all our philosophy an ancient trend of all philosophizing // of all philosophy //, an ancient struggle? Or is it new, like our science? Or also thus: does philosophy always waver between metaphysics and critique of language? (MS 132, 7)

**Wittgenstein’s methodology reconsidered**

I shall now examine the methodology that Baker imputes to Wittgenstein.

i. *Primarily therapeutic.* No one, I think, would dispute that Wittgenstein’s later philosophy has a therapeutic goal – analogically speaking. Philosophy, he held, is the resolution of philosophical problems and dissolving of philosophical puzzlement. Philosophical problems are conceptual. They involve misunderstandings and misconstruals of the conceptual articulations of our language (or, in a later idiom, of our conceptual scheme). Hence they are solved (PI §133) or dissolved (BT 421) by the clarification of the relevant grammatical structures and by the elimination of the *various* misconceived ideas that stand in the way of attaining a clear view of how a particular network of interrelated concepts hangs together. Philosophy is then therapeutic in so far as it restores the bewildered to an optimal intellectual state of good sense – akin to good health (here lies the analogy with therapy).

Wittgenstein’s ‘therapy’, however, involves *many* methods, not one (PI §133). Salient among them is assembling reminders of how the relevant words are generally used (PI §127), getting people to remember that they really use words in such-and-such a way (BT 419). We must draw attention to familiar grammatical rules (for ‘certain grammatical rules become interesting only when philosophers
want to transgress them’ (BT 425)), and arrange them in such a manner that an overview of the conceptual structure will be achieved and the philosophical problem at hand dissolved. The aim of philosophy is to stop people from transgressing the bounds of sense: ‘to erect a wall at the point where language stops anyway’ (BT 425). So, ‘We want to replace wild conjectures and explanations by quiet weighing of linguistic facts’ (Z §447). In order to disentangle the knots we tie in our understanding (of the concept of the infinite, for example), we need a ‘comparative surveyable representation of all the applications, illustrations, conceptions of the calculus [this being the example under consideration]. The complete survey of everything that may produce unclarity’ (Z §273). It would be mistaken to suppose that this does not involve the positive task of delineating the logical geography of the puzzling concepts (of which more below). Of course, this is not l’art pour l’art (conceptual cartography for its own sake) – the conceptual map is produced to help us know our way about and to prevent us from getting lost.

ii. Person-relative and patient-specific. It is quite wrong to suppose that Wittgenstein’s targets are always specific muddles of specific people – and I know of no place in which he declares any such self-limiting intent. The Investigations is not comparable to a GP’s casebook (pp. 68, 132). Wittgenstein nowhere suggests any such thing and he aspired to achieve something far more general than this would imply. In the Preface he characterizes the Investigations as journeys ‘over a wide field of thought’ that resulted in ‘sketches of landscapes’ which conjunctively give one ‘a picture of the landscape’. The subjects with which he is concerned, he wrote, are ‘the concepts of meaning, of understanding, of a proposition, of logic, the foundations of mathematics, states of consciousness, and other things’ – not ‘the confusions of my friends and acquaintances in Vienna and Cambridge’. It is mistaken to suppose (p. 68) that Wittgenstein never addressed grand schools of philosophical thought such as logicism (in RFM) or intuitionism (primarily in his lectures), or grand doctrines, such as Platonism (in RFM and LFM) or idealism (via his various anatomizations of the deep errors of solipsism, e.g. in BB), or pervasive misconceived ways of thinking (e.g. of the mind as a private domain to which the subject has privileged access by introspection, the contents of which are privately owned (PI and RPP)).
Wittgenstein did not open the *Investigations* with a quotation from St Augustine because he was concerned with Augustine’s tormented confusions—Augustine was not in the least intellectually tortured by his description of how he thought he learned to speak. Nor was Wittgenstein concerned with giving the saint a psycho-therapeutic session. Rather, as he told Malcolm, he selected the passage from Augustine not because he could not find the conception there expressed as well stated by other philosophers, but because the conception *must* be important if so great a mind held it.\(^{21}\) For most of mankind, he wrote, the conception articulated by Augustine is the most natural way to think about the nature of language (MS. 141, 1). And this natural way of thinking is the source of widespread philosophical confusions and errors that run through much of Western philosophy. It is mistaken to suppose that the private language arguments are addressed exclusively or specifically to modern empiricists, especially Russell’s *Analysis of Mind*, and perhaps Schlick and Carnap or Cambridge contemporaries (pp. 117, 138). On the contrary, in discussing the idea of a private language, Wittgenstein wrote, he was talking about the problems of idealism and solipsism (MS 165, 102). The nonsense against which he was struggling, he said, was ‘the semi-solipsism that says that I know my sensations intimately since I have them, and then I generalize my own case’ (MS 165, 150). Baker claims that to interpret the private language arguments as a *reductio* of Cartesian dualism appears to be a ‘grotesque genre-misidentification’, for Wittgenstein is not lodging objections to Great Philosophers and trying to score points off them, as Anthony Kenny and I are said to have claimed (pp. 138f.). I agree that *Wittgenstein* was not confronting Descartes and Locke, neither of whom he ever read. But his arguments, if correct, definitively undermine their philosophies—as Kenny argued with respect to Descartes, and I (and others) have argued, with respect to Locke.\(^{22}\) In his lectures, Wittgenstein cited Hardy’s

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supposition that ‘a reality corresponds to mathematical propositions’, and added ‘The fact that he said it does not matter; what is important is that it is a thing which lots of people would like to say’ (LFM 239).

Wittgenstein thought of himself in 1931 as the destroyer of the great tradition of Western philosophy. He could hardly have simultaneously thought that his new method was concerned only with providing individual (tailor-made) therapies for his circle of friends and acquaintances.

iii. A face-to-face ‘talk-cure’. Wittgenstein did indeed declare that he must find the exact form of expression that misleads the philosophically confused, and that this must be so done that his reader will exclaim ‘Yes, that is exactly the way I meant it’ (BT 410; cf. PI §254). If an error turns on the adoption of a misconceived analogy, then one must find out exactly what it is – and the criterion of success is acknowledgement (ibid.). He also claimed that he should be the mirror in which his reader can see the errors of his ways of thinking (MS 112, 225). But it would be wrong to suppose that he was involved in ‘face-to-face talk-cures’ (save perhaps in his lectures and conversations). He criticized Russell’s theory of desire with a crushing reductio ad absurdum, but did not wait on Russell’s consent. He criticized Frege’s conception of an Annahme, not offering an imaginary face-to-face ‘talk cure’, but an array of counter-arguments. He relatively rarely addressed the conceptual muddles of specific people other than those of his youthful self – which he treated as exemplary. In general, he delineated forms of conceptual confusion and misconceived conceptual analogies that seemed to him to be powerfully tempting, and commonly (but not uniformly) also more or less perennial. Causal theories of belief and desire are typically adopted by empiricists and scientists, and Russell was merely an example of an error that Wittgenstein aimed to extirpate. The temptation to think of every sentence as containing in its depth-grammar a sentence-radical and mood operator is deep (and characterized much philosophy of language after Wittgenstein’s death) – Frege merely provided an example of a general error that Wittgenstein

strove to eradicate.

What is true is that Wittgenstein had a liking for the interrogative methods of Socratic dialogue (on a modest *Bemerkungen* scale) in his writings. This is indeed important (and perhaps indicates a source of Baker’s misinterpretations). For Wittgenstein had an unparalleled concern with the roots of philosophical error and misconception, and he found this Socratic form the most fruitful way to characterize the genesis of a conceptual confusion and the most illuminating way to present the dissolution of such types of puzzlement. But such dialogical methods are perfectly compatible with generality in purpose and implication.

There is no passage that I know of that restricts Wittgenstein’s philosophical methods to people, or to the philosophical problems of people, who are suffering ‘intellectual torment’. He examined the flaws of Platonism in mathematics, but there is no suggestion that only mathematical Platonists who are in torment can learn from his clarifications. He criticized intuitionism in mathematics, but added no qualifications that his criticisms are of use only to tormented intuitionists. His ultimate goal was to clarify and disentangle conceptual confusions. He never asserted or, I fancy, would have asserted that his goal is the enhancement of human freedom of thought.

iv. The responsibility for philosophical confusion, like the responsibility for psycho-analytic disorder, is shifted to the patient. Baker claims that according to Wittgenstein (and Waismann) we are not the ‘victims’ of the grammatical features of our languages (‘As if we couldn’t help having problems about existence’) – but only of our own prejudices and dogmas (pp. 198f.). But even in the early 1930s (when he introduced the psychoanalytic analogy), Wittgenstein attributed philosophical confusions to grammatical features of our languages. ‘Why are grammatical problems so tough and ineradicable?’, he queried. ‘Because they are connected with the oldest thought habits, i.e. with the oldest pictures *that are engraved into our language itself*’, he replied (BT 423, emphasis added). He elaborated further:

One keeps hearing the remark that philosophy really makes no progress, that the same philosophical problems that
had occurred to the Greeks are still occupying us. But those who say that don’t understand the reason it is must be so. The reason is that our language has remained the same and seduces us into asking the same questions over and over. As long as there is a verb ‘to be’ which seems to function like ‘to eat’ and ‘to drink’, as long as there are adjectives like ‘identical’, ‘true’, ‘false’, ‘possible’, as long as one talks about a flow of time and an expanse of space, etc., etc., humans will continue to bump up against the same mysterious difficulties...’ (BT 424).

So problems about existence are well-nigh unavoidable. Furthermore, Wittgenstein held that

Language contains the same traps for everyone; the immense network of well-kept passable false paths. And thus we see one person after another walking the same paths and we know already where he will make a turn, where he will keep going on straight ahead without noticing the turn, etc. etc. Therefore wherever false paths branch off I should put up signs which help one get by the dangerous places. (BT 423)

So we are, to a large degree, ‘victims’ of the misleading forms of our language. ‘Philosophy is a struggle against the bewitchment of our understanding by means of language’ (PI §109).

v. No ‘dossier’ of grammatical facts. To be sure, Wittgenstein did not compile dossiers of anything. But the claim that he did not think it his business to delineate the grammar of expressions flies in the face of his writings. In a letter to Schlick of 20.11.1931, he wrote that the main difference between the conception advanced in the Tractatus and his new one is that he now realizes that the analysis of propositions does not turn on discovering hidden things, ‘but on tabulating, on the surveyable representation of, grammar, i.e. the grammatical uses of words’. Our grammar, he said, is lacking in surveyability (PI §122; BT 417). Baker suggests that by ‘grammar’ here (and in many other places), Wittgenstein means not the rules for the uses of words, but rather the grammarians’ modes of
representing those rules (p. 59). But this, as far as I know, has no textual warrant.\textsuperscript{24} Wittgenstein’s original example of the difficulty of attaining an overview of the use of a word was the logical connectives – the grammar of which he had erroneously represented in the \textit{Tractatus} as exhausted by the truth-tables, overlooking the fact that a non-molecular proposition such as ‘A is red’ entails ‘A is not green (blue, brown, etc.)’ (MS 108, 31). Hence the work of the philosopher consists in assembling reminders of how words are used (BT 415, 419; PI §127) – we recollect that we really used words in this way. The task of philosophy is to describe the use of words \textit{for a particular purpose}, to tabulate the rules for the use of words, and arrange them in a perspicuous representation that will dissolve a particular problem or range of problems.

Baker thinks that establishing that a certain word is normally used in such-and-such a way risks ‘falling into dogmatism’ (p. 116). But there is no ground for such fear in Wittgenstein’s grammatical observations. There is nothing dogmatic, nor any risk of dogmatism, about reminding ourselves that we do not say, ‘When I said such-and-such I quickly meant that ...’; that we do not ask ‘How long did it take you to mean that?’; that we do not say ‘I decided to mean ...’, ‘I tried hard to mean ...’, or ‘I succeeded in meaning ...’. Reminding ourselves of such grammatical facts (viz. that there is no such thing as meaning something quickly or slowly, and no such thing as deciding to mean something or trying to mean something, etc.) enables us to resist the temptations generated by the surface grammar of ‘to mean’, which resembles the surface grammar of activity verbs and process verbs. For the sentence ‘When I said “...”, I meant ...’ appears to make reference to a pair of acts: saying and meaning (PI §664). But the depth-grammar of ‘to mean’, its multiple connections and articulations, show that \textit{to mean something} by a word is not to perform an action or engage in an activity of any kind. ‘To mean’ should not be

\textsuperscript{24} Baker held that the colour-octahedron is meant to be a second-order representation of the grammar of colour-words, i.e. not an \textit{expression} of the rules for the use of colour words at all. Accordingly, the colour octahedron does not itself belong to grammar (pp. 24f.). But Wittgenstein wrote that ‘The colour octahedron is grammar, since it says that you can speak of a reddish-blue but not of a reddish-green, etc.’ (PR 75), that it is a perspicuous representation of the grammar of colour words precisely because it ‘wears the rules of grammar on its face’ (PR 278). It is ‘really a part of grammar ... It tells us what we can do: we can speak of greenish-blue but not of greenish-red, etc.’ (LWL 8). When I pointed this out to Baker in 1991, he shrugged his shoulders and said that perhaps there was no coherent position in Wittgenstein at this point. But the position is perfectly coherent.
compared to activity verbs such as ‘to speak’, but to such verbs as ‘to intend’. Hence Wittgenstein’s remark (in a different context): ‘In order to be able to attain an overview of these concepts, you must compare them in ways other than their surface-grammar suggests. You must see different parts as homologous; what looks like a jawbone should be compared with a foot’ (MS 134, 126).

There is no dogmatism or any risk of dogmatism in citing mundane grammatical facts that any user of the language will recognize. After all, the worst that can happen is that someone may reply that he uses the word differently. So be it – then Wittgenstein will hear his explanation of how he uses the word, and pick up the argument from there. Baker queries how Wittgenstein could sustain the dogmatic thesis according to which any kind of ostensive definition requires a sample. The answer, of course, is that he could not (since an ostensive definition of a point of the compass (PI §28) does not), and that he never made any such claim. But he could and did assert that if an ostensive definition does incorporate a sample, the sample functions as part of the means of representation, not as an object represented (and that is no ‘thesis’, but a description of the use of samples). Baker asks how Wittgenstein knew that neither a sensation nor a mental image can play the role of a sample. The answer is given in the private language arguments: such a putative sample could not satisfy the requirement on explanations of meaning that function as standards of correct use that there be a difference between thinking one is using a word correctly and using it correctly. That is not a dogmatic thesis, but the conclusion of an argument.

25 In his paper ‘Wittgenstein’s “Depth Grammar”’ (p. 91n. 48), Baker cites this passage (misidentified as occurring in Vol. XII, 132) as supporting his interpretation of the depth-grammar of words as having to do with the integration of sentences into human activities, the uses of sentences, the context-dependence of the senses of sentences, the invocation of imaginary language games as objects of comparison, etc. He mistranslates the passage, confusing ‘Kiefer’ (jawbone) with ‘Käfer’ (beetle) and speculates what ‘far-fetched comparisons’ [as between a beetle and a foot] Wittgenstein might have had in mind. Wittgenstein didn’t have any far-fetched comparisons in mind – his metaphor remains within the domain of comparative skeletal morphology. (The choice of Kiefer (maxillary) is perhaps a deliberate allusion to Goethe’s discovery of the Zwischenkieferknochen (intermaxillary), which is singularly apt, given the affinity between Wittgenstein’s morphological methods in conceptual analysis and Goethe’s morphological methods in botany and zoology (see Joachim Schulte, ‘Chor und Gesetz: Zur “morphologischen Methode” bei Goethe und Wittgenstein’, repr. in his Chor und Gesetz (Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main, 1990), pp. 11-42). The comparisons Wittgenstein had in mind were indeed such things as comparing ‘to mean’ not with ‘to say’ or ‘to speak’, but with ‘to intend’. Baker’s construal of Wittgenstein’s conception of the depth-grammar of words specifies things that are not grammar at all, and that concern not words but sentences and their uses. But Wittgenstein (in §664) is concerned with the deceptive surface-grammar of the word ‘to mean’ (meinen); namely, that it looks like a verb of action; and the sentence ‘When I said “...”, I meant ...’ looks as if it refers to two actions that I performed. The next thirty remarks show that the grammar of ‘to mean’ is more akin to that of ‘to intend’ than to activity or process verbs.
What did Wittgenstein mean by ‘dogmatism’? Certainly not the tabulating of rules for the uses of words where this is required to dissolve a conceptual confusion. His observations on ‘object’ and ‘elementary proposition’ in the *Tractatus* were dogmatic, he wrote in the above-mentioned letter to Schlick. ‘If one wants to understand the word “object”, for example, one looks to see how it is actually used.’ If one thus tabulates the grammatical use of words, then ‘therewith everything dogmatic that I said in the *Tractatus* about “object” and “elementary propositions” collapses.’ Elsewhere he remarked that dogmatism in philosophy consists in stating grammatical rules that are not acknowledged by everyone as the rules of their language, for that again engenders the impression that there are discoveries to be made in philosophy (MS 110, 222), as if we might discover the rules that we are following in our use of words. So, contrary to Baker, it is part of the method to tabulate agreed rules, and far from it being dogmatic to describe the use of a word, it is the opposite of, and the main means of combating, dogmatism.

vi. The main source of error is ‘pictures’, and one cannot combat a picture with an argument. Baker holds that according to Wittgenstein the primary source of philosophical confusion (‘torments’) are pictures. He claims that ‘pictures’ cannot be combated by argument, but only with other pictures (pp. 268f.). Hence, he avers, Wittgensteinian therapy is a form of homoeopathy (p. 188).

Certainly Wittgenstein held that we are misled by ‘pictures’, but it should be noted that he uses the word ‘Bild’ in many different meanings. Sometimes ‘a picture’ signifies a conception (and a conception can certainly be true or false, correct or incorrect, supported or undermined by evidence and argument); sometimes it signifies a model (and a model may surely be right or wrong, adequate or inadequate); sometimes it signifies an emblematic representation, akin to Bentham’s linguistic archetypes (and while these may not be true or false, correct or incorrect, they may be correctly applied or incorrectly applied). However, Wittgenstein ascribed philosophical error and confusion to many sources other than pictures. He held that we are misled by the forms of our language, by our tendency to neglect the uses of expressions, by our disposition to seek for generality where it is unavailable, by our desire
to explain conceptual forms rather than merely describing them, by our tendency to construct theories in philosophy, by our disposition to emulate the methods of science, and so forth.

It is perfectly true that Wittgenstein sometimes juxtaposed one picture with another, tried to induce us to look at things differently (MS 118, 73v and 77v), and thus to change our ‘way of looking at things’ (PI §144). But, first, this is but one among many different methods of philosophy (PI §133) – and not the main one. Secondly, we must attend carefully, in each case, to what he meant by ‘a picture’. Thirdly, it is noteworthy that in Investigations §144, which Baker repeatedly cites, Wittgenstein appends to his remark on juxtaposing pictures the parenthesis ‘(Indian mathematicians: “Look at this.”)’ – alluding to the fact that Indian mathematicians use pictures, namely geometrical drawings, as proofs (MS 161, 6) – not as ‘propaganda’ for different ways of looking at things (p. 219).

Wittgenstein did not hold that a picture can be combated only with another picture: in so far as Augustine’s puzzlement about how we can measure time was rooted in a ‘picture’, it was a false, i.e. mistaken, picture of measuring time, and can be shown to be false by clarifying what is called ‘measuring time’ and how it differs from measuring length. The author of the Tractatus had ‘a false and idealized picture of the use of language’ (PG 211), which is shown to be so not by substituting an alternative ‘picture’, but by scrutinizing the use of the words ‘name’, ‘proposition’, etc. and coming to realize that they are not applied on the grounds of common characteristics (cf. PI §66), that a name need not signify something simple, that a proposition need not be a logical picture, that an elementary proposition (containing no logical constant) can have logical consequences, e.g. ‘A is red’ entails ‘A is not blue, not green, etc.’. When held captive by a picture (a preconception) and trying to fathom the essence of the

\footnote{Baker intimates that a ‘picture’ can be false only in the sense that it is held unconsciously and misleads (p. 158). His editor summarizes his view thus (p. 10): ‘Wittgenstein is not in the business of demonstrating that this or that picture or analogy is mistaken ... it makes no sense to call a picture or analogy “false” in the sense of “mistaken”,’ and adds (p. 17, fn. 30) that ‘Wittgenstein was often tempted to use such phrases as “false analogy” or “misleading picture”, but he also regularly indicates misgivings about these expressions by putting wavy lines under “false” or “misleading” in these phrases (e.g. MS 110, 300, BT 409)’. In fact Wittgenstein uses the phrase ‘false analogy’ (‘falsche/(falschen) Analogie’) 45 times in the Nachlass, 44 times without misgivings as far as I was able to detect. The only time in which he manifested qualms is in the example Dr Morris cites in MS 110, 300. In BT 409 he manifests qualms about ‘incorrect analogy’ (‘dass diese Analogie nicht stimmt’). ‘Misleading analogy’ occurs seven times, without qualms. ‘Misleading picture’ is used rarely, but without any misgivings.}
proposition or the name, as the author of the *Tractatus* was (PI §§115f.), what is needed is not another picture, but to ask whether the word ‘proposition’ or ‘name’, for example, is ‘ever actually used in this way in the language-game which is its original home’, and so to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use (PI §116).\(^{27}\) When we have a correct picture (as when we think that lengthening a piece of string that circles the globe by a yard is increasing its length by a tiny fraction) and misapply the picture (as when we think that the string will extend beyond the surface of the globe by the tiniest of distances), our misapplication is not discarded in the light of a new picture, but in the light of an explanation of where we went wrong (the taut string will be about six inches from the surface

\(^{27}\) In his article ‘Wittgenstein on Metaphysical/Everyday Use’ (pp. 100f.), Baker claims that a ‘metaphysical use’ of words is any use in which one tries to state the essence of a thing, and that ‘ordinary use’ has nothing to do with normal or ordinary usage, but simply means ‘non-metaphysical’. His evidence for this is that in the ancestor of PI §116 in BT 411f., Wittgenstein wrote ‘What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical use to their correct // normal // use in language’, thus indicating unease about the word ‘correct’. Baker takes this to show that Wittgenstein started from the word ‘metaphysical’ and ‘then tried to find some down-to-earth expression that means “non-metaphysical”.’ The term “everyday” in §116 seems to represent yet another attempt to solve this same problem.’ His radical interpretation of Wittgenstein’s plea to return to ordinary use rests on this conjectural basis. But his conjecture is unwarranted.

First, Wittgenstein’s qualms concern the fact that one cannot say that ordinary use is correct; rather, ordinary use sets the standard of correctness, and is itself neither correct nor incorrect. A use of a word is correct (if no stipulation, or metaphorical or technical use is intended), if it is in accordance with ordinary use. That is why Wittgenstein opted first for ‘normal’ and then for ‘ordinary’, rather than ‘correct’.

Secondly, none of these terms means ‘non-metaphysical’ – any more than in the contrast between scientific and religious, ‘religious’ means ‘non-scientific’; and there is no reason whatsoever to suppose that Wittgenstein was looking for a word that meant ‘non-metaphysical’, or for thinking, as Baker did, that of the pair ‘metaphysical use’ and ‘ordinary use’, the former ‘wears the trousers’.

Thirdly, BT 429f. notes: In the theories and battles of philosophy we find words whose meanings are well-known to us from everyday life used in an ultra-physical sense.

When philosophers use a word and search for its meaning, one must always ask: is this word ever really used this way in the language which created it // for which it is created? Usually one will find that it is not so, and that the word is used against // contrary to // its normal grammar. (“Knowing”, “Being”, “Thing”.) Here it is evident that ordinary use wears the trousers, and that the ultra-physical (metaphysical) use is aberrant.

It is curious that Baker holds that any use of words that tries to state the essence of a thing is, according to Wittgenstein, ‘metaphysical’, since Wittgenstein held that ‘essence is determined by grammar’ (PI §371). It is grammar that tells us what kind of object anything is (PI §373). Indeed, Wittgenstein insisted, ‘we too in these investigations are trying to understand the essence of language, its function, its structure’ (PI §92) – only not by analysis that reveals something hidden beneath the surface of language (ibid.) ‘What is the essence of dogmatism?’, Wittgenstein queried; to which he replied ‘Isn’t it the assertion of a necessary proposition about all possible rules’ (MS 111, 87); and surely did not think of himself here as engaged in the metaphysics of dogmatism. There is nothing metaphysical about stating the essences of things that have essences. What is objectionably metaphysical is to think that essences are language independent, and that the rules of our grammars are necessary rules that could not be otherwise, as he had thought of the rules of logical syntax when delineating the metaphysics of symbolism in the *Tractatus* (that only simple names can represent simple things, only relations can represent relations and only facts can represent facts).
of the earth, and, of course, six inches, although by no means the tiniest of distances from the surface of the globe, is but a tiny fraction of the radius of the earth).

Baker suggests that the Augustinian picture is not combated with argument, but only with another picture, namely the picture of meaning as use (p. 269). But Wittgenstein did have arguments to support the (grammatical) proposition that the meaning of a name is not the object (if any) that it stands for, and he argued against the view that every assertion contains an assumption, as indeed he argued against the view that ostensive definition fixes the foundations of language by connecting indefinables to simples in reality that are their meanings. If he thought that his assertion that ‘For a large class of cases – though not for all ... the meaning of a word is its use in the language’ offered us no more than an alternative picture to the Augustinian one, then it is puzzling that he should have said in his lectures:

I have suggested substituting for “meaning of a word”, “use of a word”, because use of a word comprises a large part of what is meant by “the meaning of a word”. The use of a word is what is defined by the rules, just as the use of the king of chess is defined by the rules. ...

I also suggest examining the correlate expression “explanation of meaning”, ... it is less difficult to describe what we call “explanation of meaning” than to explain “meaning”. The meaning of a word is explained by describing its use (AWL 48).

It is equally surprising that in the Blue Book he should have said that ‘The meaning of a phrase for us is characterized by the use we make of it. ... We ask “What do you mean?’, i.e., “How do you use this

28 In the preceding paragraph of Ambrose’s lecture notes, Wittgenstein remarks that he will not proceed by enumerating different meanings for the words ‘understanding’ and ‘meaning’, but instead ‘draw ten or twelve pictures that are similar in some ways to the actual use of these words’. It is, however, far from clear that the above paragraph was meant to delineate one such ‘picture’, especially given the frequency with which Wittgenstein elsewhere associated meaning and use, without any mention that this was but one ‘picture’ among others. He repeated the same point in his talk to the Moral Science Club meeting on 23.2.1939, remarking ‘In a vast number of cases it is possible to replace “the meaning of a word” by “the use of a word” without making any claim that this is a ‘picture’ – it is, he observed, a slogan, and a very useful one at that. There are many dozens of remarks in which “Bedeutung” is linked with “Gebrauch”, but none, as far as I know, that state that the ‘slogan’ is but a picture.
expression?” (BB 65) and later adds ‘We are inclined to forget that it is the particular use of a word only which gives the word its meaning. Let us think of our old example for the use of words. Someone is sent to the grocer with a slip of paper with the words “five apples” written on it. The use of the word in practice is its meaning’ (BB 69). This is not a picture, but part of Wittgenstein’s description of the grammar of the phrase ‘the meaning of a word’.

Baker claims that the Augustinian picture of language is treated by Wittgenstein as beyond the reach of any arguments based on the grammar of the concepts of name, sentence, proposition, etc. – it is, in a sense, unassailable (p. 275). It cannot be combated by giving a correct description of these concepts but only by another picture. But this was not Wittgenstein’s view at all. Baker confuses Augustine’s picture of the essence of language, which is implicit in the quotation from the Confessions, namely, that words name objects and sentences are combinations of words, with the idea, which has its roots in that picture, that ‘Every word has a meaning. This meaning is correlated with the word. It is the object for which the word stands’ (PI §1). This is a conception of language – ‘an approach’ according to which, ‘naming is the essence of language’ (MS 111, 15) and ‘the meaning of a word is seen as the foundation of language’ (MS 152, 38-40), and in which the form of explanation of words by ostension is thought to be fundamental (BT 25), inasmuch as it links language with reality. This is ‘a philosophical concept of meaning’ or ‘the philosophical idea of the meaning of words’ (MS 152, 87). The concept of meaning it incorporates ‘stems from a primitive philosophical conception of language’ or ‘a primitive philosophy of language’ (BT 24v, 25). These ideas incorporate misdescriptions of the grammar of our concepts of language, name, meaning, etc. They are incorrect (as Wittgenstein laboured to show) – not factual errors, but conceptual ones. Far from being unassailable and irrefutable, these claims are combated by argument, i.e. by giving countervailing reasons, throughout Wittgenstein’s lengthy and

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29 Baker suggests that the occasional qualification ‘for us’ (as here in the quotation from BB) or ‘in our sense’ (PG 60) is the mark of an optional ‘picture’ rather than of a dogmatic assertion about the use of the word ‘meaning’. I agree that it is not a dogmatic assertion about the use of the word ‘meaning’ – it is an undogmatic assertion about that use. Wittgenstein sometimes qualified his remarks on meaning in the early thirties in this way in order to contrast this use of meaning (Bedeutung) with Frege’s use (and his own use in the Tractatus) – which was, in fact, a misuse, or with the empiricist use of ‘meaning’ to signify a characteristic sensation accompanying the use of a word (PG 60) – which was a muddle.
detailed discussions of these matters. For it is, for various reasons, mistaken to suppose that naming is the foundation of language; that all words are names; that ostensive definition is essential to language, and that it links language to reality; that the meaning of a word is the object it stands for, and that all words stand for objects. To hold such things is to exhibit misunderstanding and conceptual (not factual) confusion – including categorial confusion.

Wittgenstein and Ryle 1: categorial confusions

Baker insists that Wittgenstein’s conception and method of philosophy is radically unlike that of Ryle (the point is made in 11 of the 13 essays in *Wittgenstein’s Method*), and he castigates other interpreters of Wittgenstein, especially Anthony Kenny, for misguidedly thinking that there is any significant similarity between the two. In particular, Baker asserts that Wittgenstein, unlike Ryle, was not concerned with category mistakes and categorial confusions, and that he was not interested in the ‘logical geography’ of concepts. It is unfortunate that in the last years of his life Baker did not make use of the Bergen electronic version of Wittgenstein’s *Nachlass* that was then available. Had he checked the sources with the benefit of the search-engine, I do not think that he would have made such claims. I shall deal first with Wittgenstein and Ryle on categorial confusions.

According to Baker, ‘Wittgenstein refrained from pinpointing “category-mistakes” and from classifying words into logical types’ (p. 91n. 51). Wittgenstein believed that the difficulty of seeing and describing the use of words ‘arises from the presence of pictures of grammar which we have constructed in order to orient ourselves. If we could get rid of these obstacles, we could easily describe the use of words. The issue is no longer that of category mistakes’ (p. 115). His method ‘is not to impose some category discipline (Ryle), e.g. to pinpoint a mistake in seeing thinking as an activity’ (p. 197). Indeed, he adopted a quite different method, for example, ‘that calling thinking a mental process or mental

30 See pp. 23, 70n. 8, 74, 76, 91n.5, 94, 95, 105n. 13, 109-12, 115, 121, 131, 176n. 45, 177n. 52, 181, 197, 199.

31 See pp. 26, 52, 70n. 4, 74, 145, 165, 171, 260, 276.
activity involves drawing misleading analogies between the use of “think” and that of certain other expressions – analogies he attempted to displace in favour of other analogies’ (p. 91n. 51).

I believe that Baker misrepresents Ryle and misunderstands Wittgenstein. There are many differences between Ryle and Wittgenstein\(^{32}\), but the idea that the former held that many philosophical problems and confusions stem from category mistakes and categorial confusions and that the latter eschewed any such diagnosis is not one of them.

Wittgenstein frequently drew, and insisted upon, categorial distinctions, and attributed many philosophical muddles to categorial confusions. That one wants to say that the present is fleeting (constantly disappearing, cannot be grasped) is a confusion resting on the attempt ‘to apply to immediate experience a category that can be applied only to the physical world’ (MS 108, 27). The difference ‘between two distinct categories’, he asserted, is not a difference of degree (MS 108, 87). One cannot put equations and inequations on the same level as if they were just different animal species – rather the two arithmetic methods are ‘categorially distinct’ (MS 108, 132). The word ‘tree’ and the phrase ‘my image (Vorstellung) of a tree’ belong to two different grammatical categories (MS 110, 241). An infinite possibility (e.g. infinite divisibility) belongs to a ‘completely different grammatical category’ from a finite possibility (e.g. the possibility of trisecting something) (MS 111, 121; cf. MS 106, 178 and MS 113, 88r for further observations on category differences between the finite and the infinite). A mathematical proposition with a proof ‘belongs to a different category’ from one without a proof (MS 113, 73v.).

It might be said that all these remarks date from the early 1930s, and he may later have changed his mind about category differences and categorial confusions. But that would be mistaken – Wittgenstein invokes these ideas just as frequently after 1945. One cannot simply say that grasping a proposition thus or thus is not an experience, he insisted, one must ‘show the categorial difference’ between understanding and an experience (MS 130, 278; cf. MS 130, 289). MS 133 is largely concerned with psychological concepts. On p. 55v Wittgenstein contemplates introducing a new nomenclature for

psychological categories. Thus one could call understanding a word an ‘ability’; but intending is no ability, and meaning a word thus and so is an intention (MS 133, 55v). Similarly, consciousness of lying ‘belongs to the category of consciousness of intention’ (MS 133, 88r). One often notices a difference which is indeed categorial, but one is unable to say what it consists in – then one often says that one knows the difference by introspection (MS 133, 93). The ‘categorial difference’ between the state of being in pain and of believing is important (MS 134, 39). An attitude belongs to ‘a different category’ from a psychological process (MS 135, 130). The meaning of ‘to interpret’ (deuten) is connected with that of ‘to speak’, but ‘the two are categorially different’ (MS 137, 41a). Of course, a sense-impression is not a drawing, it is not even something ‘of the same category’ that I carry around within me but cannot show to another (MS 137, 121b). The uncertainties about another’s feelings, intentions, beliefs, mental images, etc. all belong to ‘different categories’, and need to be explained in quite different ways (MS 138, 29b). While discussing the concept of vision, Wittgenstein notes the distinction between seeing a thing and seeing the difference (or the similarity) between two things: what is important is ‘the categorial difference between the two “objects” of vision’ (MS 144, 38). ‘Knowledge’ and ‘certainty’, he asserted, ‘belong to different categories’ (MS 175, 37r).

The later Wittgenstein did not think that categorial distinctions are sharp and precise, as he had in the Tractatus. He was very aware that the most general terms, such as ‘experience’, ‘event’, ‘process’, ‘state’, ‘something’, ‘fact’, ‘description’, ‘report’, which in the Tractatus he had conceived to be sharply defined categorial terms, have an extremely blurred meaning (RPP I, §648). Contrary to what he had earlier thought, grammatical categories are not akin to variables with a sharply defined range of values, and failure of intersubstitutability salva significatione in some context is not an adequate test of categorial difference. He was not aiming at some definitive classification of psychological concepts, he wrote, but rather at showing the extent to which the existing classification of psychological concepts can be justified (zeigen inwieweit die bestehende [Einteilung] sich rechtfertigen lässt), and also showing that any such classification involves indeterminacies. The classification should serve only to emphasize crude differences between categories (MS 136, 131b). In this respect, he did not differ from the later Ryle, who
wrote in *Dilemmas* (1954)

This idiom [of categories] can be helpful as a familiar mnemonic with some beneficial associations. It can also be an impediment, if credited with the virtues of a skeleton-key. I think it is worthwhile to take some pains with this word ‘category’, but not for the usual reason, namely that there exists an exact professional way of using it, in which, like a skeleton-key, it will turn all our locks for us; but rather for the unusual reason that there is an inexact, amateurish way of using it in which, like a coal-hammer, it will make a satisfactory knocking noise on doors which we want opened to us. It gives answers to none of our questions but it can be made to arouse people to the answers in a properly brusque way.  

No doubt Ryle had earlier made too much of the notion of a category and of a category-mistake. But it is noteworthy that even in respect of *Concept of Mind* (1949), Austin already remarked in his review of the book that *in practice*, Ryle did ‘not confine himself to any single technique or method of argument, nor is the book one whit the worse for that’.  

Did Wittgenstein deny that we commit category mistakes? Did he ‘refrain from pinpointing category mistakes’? On the contrary. When distinguishing between the grammar of ‘to mean’ and that of ‘to think’, he wrote (MS 165, 51-3):

and there could be nothing more mistaken *[nichts Verfehleres könnte es geben]* than to call “meaning” a mental activity. ... once it has become clear that the different verbs, including the “psychological” ones such as meaning, thinking, fearing, being startled, expecting, etc. have categorially different // completely incomparable // uses (toolbox) then the investigation of a particular case will no longer present us with frightful difficulties.

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Still later, at the end of 1947, he wrote (MS 135, p. vi):

> What should I call it when one takes belief, expectation, as the preparation of the organism, of the nervous system, for an event in the external world; or when one thinks that intending is an experience, because an image of what is intended may accompany the decision, and so forth?

> It is a confusion of categories [Vermengung der Kategorien]. A failure to distinguish concept-types [Ein Nicht-Unterscheiden der Begriffarten] and an inclination to substitute a particular concept-type for all others. A conceptual misunderstanding [Ein begriffliches Missverständnis].

**Wittgenstein and Ryle 2: logical geography**

We are masters of the techniques of the use of words in our native tongue, and yet we have the greatest difficulty in attaining an overview of these uses. We know how to use words, but cannot adequately describe that use. How can this be? Baker alleges that Ryle’s explanation was that we all have a practical skill (know-how), but do not know the theory that underlies this practice (pp. 115, 135f.), and he refers to Concept of Mind, pp. 7-8 to substantiate this claim. One would be surprised to find Ryle asserting that there is a theory underlying the normal speaker’s use of words. After all, this is a doctrine that post-dates Ryle. It sprang into popularity in the 1970s with Dummett’s quest for a theory of meaning for a natural language which would constitute a theoretical representation of a practical ability.\(^{35}\) If we turn to Concept of Mind, pp. 7-8, we find that Ryle made no such claim. What he wrote was ‘The philosophical arguments which constitute this book are intended not to increase what we know about other minds, but to rectify the logical geography of the knowledge which we already possess’. We have all learnt how to apply a wide variety of mental concepts, Ryle continued:

> It is, however, one thing to know how to apply such concepts, quite another to know how to correlate them with one

another and with concepts of other sorts. Many people can talk sense with concepts but cannot talk sense about them; they know by practice how to operate with concepts, anyhow inside familiar fields, but they cannot state the logical regulations governing their use. They are like people who know their way about their own parish, but cannot construct or read a map of it.

There is no mention here of ignorance of a theory – only of inability to sketch the logical geography of concepts. Moreover, the explanation that Ryle offered (which, to be sure, is not the only explanation he suggested of philosophical confusion) is also an explanation that Wittgenstein offered (although he too offered many further explanations). In MS 130, 220, he wrote: ‘Naturally we all know the language-games in which psychological descriptions are used – nothing could be more familiar to us. But propositions obtrude themselves [drängen sich immer Sätze ein] into our descriptions the use of which we cannot survey [deren Verwendung wir nicht übersehen], even though we have mastered them // even though we have mastered them in the practice of the language [obwohl wir sie in der Praxis der Sprache beherrschen].’

Thus far there seems no disagreement whatsoever between Wittgenstein and Ryle. Is the deep difference, then, that Ryle provided his readers with the logical geography of the concepts that are under discussion, and that Wittgenstein did not do so? Is it that Wittgenstein altogether eschewed logical geography? This is what Baker suggests. In describing the principles of his own exegetical methods, he wrote: ‘I suggest scrupulous attention to Wittgenstein’s overall therapeutic conception of his philosophical investigations: far from advocating any general positive position ... and far from undertaking to give any general outline of the logical geography of our language (or even of the narrower domain of “mentalistic” or “psychological” concepts), he always sought to address specific philosophical problems of definite individuals ...’ (p. 67). Baker castigates commentators (especially Kenny and me) for thinking that Wittgenstein is engaged in ‘logical geography à la Ryle’ (p. 26). ‘Commentators on Wittgenstein’, he wrote, ‘seem to be pulled by powerful gravitational forces towards assimilating all of his remarks to factual observations about the logical geography of natural languages’ (p. 70n. 4). But
‘Wittgenstein’s enterprise has closer affinities with sessions of psychotherapy than with didactic presentations of the logical geography of ordinary language’ (p. 145). On this view, Baker contends (pp. 198f.), ‘We are not hapless victims of circumstance; e.g. of syntactic features of English, or even of the grammatical categories of Indo-European languages. (As if we couldn’t help have problems about existence.) ... nor is there a “natural” explanation of our predicament; e.g. the discrepancy between practical know-how and the ability to describe (or explain) what we have mastery of (on the model of the divergence between knowing how to get around a city and being able to draw a useful map (Ryle).’

Baker misrepresents Ryle’s conception of ‘logical geography’; Wittgenstein was engaged in logical geography no less than Ryle; if he was not the originator of Ryle’s metaphor, he was Ryle’s precursor in inventing and invoking it; philosophical confusion, according to Wittgenstein, as we have noted above (p. ??) is rooted, inter alia, in the grammar of our languages (including the Indo-European group); and the clarification of grammar in which Wittgenstein commonly engages is typically perfectly general in intent.

First of all, what Ryle meant by ‘logical geography’ was not a set of factual observations about a natural language. He was concerned with the logical geography of mental concepts, no matter whether they are expressed in English, French or German. He was concerned with delineating the uses of certain expressions, and the ‘logical regulations’ governing the uses – and if ‘denken’, ‘penser’ and ‘think’ have the same use then the different languages share the same concept. Pointing out that to think is not the same as to talk to oneself, that one need not think in anything (neither in words, nor in pictures), that thinking is polymorphous, is not to make factual observations about English, but to make non-factual observations about thinking. Such observations are, in Wittgenstein’s jargon, ‘grammatical propositions’. Stating that sensations have a bodily location and that thoughts do not, that emotions have objects that may be altogether distinct from their causes, that intentions are not causes of action, delineates a fragment of the logical geography of the several concepts – but does not describe factual contingencies of any kind.

In 1933/4, long before Ryle wrote Concept of Mind (1949) and made famous the phrase ‘logical
geography’, Wittgenstein told his pupils ‘One difficulty with philosophy is that we lack a synoptic view. We encounter the kind of difficulty we should have with the geography of a country for which we had no map, or else a map of isolated bits. The country we are talking about is language and the geography its grammar. We can walk about the country quite well, but when forced to make a map, we go wrong’ (AWL 43). In his 1939 lectures he used a similar metaphor:

I am trying to conduct you on tours in a certain country. I will try to show you that the philosophical difficulties which arise in mathematics as elsewhere arise because we find ourselves in a strange town and do not know our way. So we must learn the topography by going from one place in the town to another, and from there to another, and so on. And one must do this so often that one knows one’s way, either immediately or pretty soon after looking around a bit, wherever one may be set down.

This is an extremely good simile. In order to be a good guide, one should show people the main streets first. ... The difficulty in philosophy is to find one’s way about. (LFM 44)

‘My aim’, he wrote for his pupils, ‘is to teach you the geography of a labyrinth, so that you know your way about it perfectly’ (MS. 162b, 6v). One does not know one’s way around the ‘foundations’ of mathematics. But this is not because one does not know what is to be done, but because the geography of the large connections is unfamiliar to us [weil die Geographie der grossen Zusammenhänge uns unbekannt ist] (MS 126, 79). The philosopher (in philosophy of mathematics) does not have to erect new buildings, or construct new bridges, but ‘to describe the geography as it now is’ (MS. 127, 199). The philosopher, Wittgenstein averred, wants to master the geography of concepts: to see every locality in its proximate and its distant surroundings (MS. 137, 63a, my emphasis).

Baker’s Wittgenstein

It may be that one reason that encouraged Gordon Baker in his psychoanalytic, therapeutic interpretation of Wittgenstein was disappointment at the extensive (largely misconceived) criticism, consequent widespread rejection, and plain disregard, of Wittgenstein’s philosophy, especially by mainstream
American philosophers writing in the Quinean tradition. If one reads Wittgenstein as Baker did in his last writings, the figure that emerges is indeed secure from criticism. Those who do not heed him can be alleged merely to exhibit the depth of their dogmatism, or their lack of torment and consequent superficiality (just as those who resist Freudian theories really confirm them). Since Baker’s Wittgenstein never asserts anything, there is nothing for him or his followers to defend as being correct, and nothing for his opponents to attack as being incorrect. His philosophical position is completely immune to counter argument (p. 276; cf. p. 169). But this immunity is obtained only by means of a one-sided selection of remarks from Wittgenstein’s writings that disregards everything that fails to fit the psycho-therapeutic straitjacket.

Those who see Wittgenstein as one of the great geniuses of philosophy will be sad to see a figure of such originality and importance reduced to these dimensions. If Baker’s interpretation were right, one of its consequences – whether intended by Baker or not – would be that Wittgenstein is a figure of very minor importance. For he is, Baker insists, relevant only for those who are suffering intellectual torment, and who need conceptual psychotherapy to ameliorate their condition. Baker’s Wittgenstein is an ‘intellectual GP’ much influenced by Freud, with a book of case histories of individual treatments of his tormented friends and acquaintances (pp. 68, 132, 173n. 12, 184). He insists on nothing. Everything is up for negotiation (pp. 192, 194, 269, 277); nothing is forced upon one by compelling argument; nothing is refuted and no one is shown to be wrong. Maximal tolerance (e.g. for Heidegger (pp. 207-10)) is manifested in the face of absurdities (for, Baker avers, it would be ‘a moral defect’ to mock Heidegger’s confusions concerning Nothingness and its activities, as Carnap did (pp. 219, 222 n.5.)). Alternative pictures are offered one, but one is free to accept or reject them at will. One can look at things this way, or that way – as one pleases.

This Wittgenstein is, I fancy, at best a rather remote relative of the Austrian Wittgenstein who taught in Cambridge, England, and who died in 1951. That Wittgenstein resolved many of the deep problems that have dogged our subject for centuries, sometimes indeed for more than two millennia, problems about the nature of linguistic representation, about the relationship between thought and
language, about solipsism and idealism, self-knowledge and knowledge of other minds, and about the nature of necessary truth and of mathematical propositions. He ploughed up the soil of European philosophy of logic and language. He gave us a novel and immensely fruitful array of insights into philosophy of psychology. He attempted to overturn centuries of reflection on the nature of mathematics and mathematical truth. He undermined foundationalist epistemology. And he bequeathed us a vision of philosophy as a contribution not to human knowledge, but to human understanding – understanding of the forms of our thought and of the conceptual confusions into which we are liable to fall.  

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