Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience

by

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Foreword xiii
Acknowledgements xvii
Introduction 1

PART 1 PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS IN NEUROSCIENCE: THEIR HISTORICAL AND CONCEPTUAL ROOTS 9

CHAPTER 1 THE EARLY GROWTH OF NEUROSCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE: THE INTEGRATIVE ACTION OF THE NERVOUS SYSTEM 11

1.1 Aristotle, Galen and Nemesius: the origins of the ventricular doctrine 12
1.2 Fernel and Descartes: the demise of the ventricular doctrine 23
1.3 The cortical doctrine of Willis and its aftermath 30
1.4 The conception of a reflex: Bell, Magendie and Marshall Hall 33
1.5 Localizing function in the cortex: Broca, Fritz and Hitzig 38
1.6 The integrative action of the nervous system: Sherrington 41

CHAPTER 2 THE CORTEX AND THE MIND IN THE WORK OF SHERRINGTON AND HIS PROTEGES 43

2.1 Charles Sherrington: the continuing Cartesian impact 43
2.2 Edgar Adrian: hesitant Cartesianism 47
2.3 John Eccles and the ‘liaison brain’ 49
2.4 Wilder Penfield and the ‘highest brain mechanism’ 57
CHAPTER 3  THE MERELOGICAL FALLACY IN NEUROSCIENCE  

3.1 Mereological confusions in cognitive neuroscience  
(Crick, Edelman, Blakemore, Young, Frisby, Gregory, Marr, Johnson-Laird) 

3.2 Methodological qualms  
(Ullman, P.S. Churchland, Blakemore, Zeki, Young, Milner Squire and Kandel, Marr, Frisby, Sperry) 

3.3 On the grounds for ascribing psychological predicates to a being  
(Crick, Baars) 

3.4 On the grounds for misascribing psychological predicates to an inner entity  
(Damasio, Edelman and Tononi, Kosslyn and Ochsner, Searle, James, Libet, Humphrey, Blakemore, Crick) 

3.5 The inner  
(Damasio) 

3.6 Introspection  
(Humphrey, Johnson-Laird, Weiskrantz) 

3.7 Privileged access: direct and indirect  
(Blakemore) 

3.8 Privacy or subjectivity  
(Searle) 

3.9 The meaning of psychological predicates and how they are learnt  
(Searle) 

3.10 Of the mind and its nature  
(Gazzaniga, Doty) 

PART II  HUMAN FACULTIES AND CONTEMPORARY NEUROSCIENCE: AN ANALYSIS  

PRELIMINARIES  
1. Brain-body dualism  
(Kandel Schwartz and Jessell, Libet) 

2. The project  
(Gazzaniga) 

3. The category of the psychological  
(Nagel, P.M. Churchland and P.S. Churchland)
CHAPTER 4    SENSATION AND PERCEPTION  

4.1 Sensation  
(Searle, Libet, Geldard and Sherrick)  

4.2 Perception  
(Crick)  

4.2.1 Perception as the causation of sensations: primary and secondary qualities  
(Kandel, Schwartz and Jessell, Rock)  

4.2.2 Perception as hypothesis formation: Helmholtz  
(Helmholtz, Gregory, Glynn, Young)  

4.2.3 Visual images and the binding problem  
(Sherrington, Damasio, Edelman, Crick, Kandel and Wurtz, Gray and Singer, Barlow)  

4.2.4 Perception as information processing: Marr’s theory of vision  
(Marr, Frisby, Crick, Ullman)  

CHAPTER 5    THE COGNITIVE POWERS  

5.1 Knowledge and its kinship with ability  

5.11 Being able to and Knowing how to  

5.12 Possessing knowledge and containing knowledge  
(LeDoux, Young, Zeki, Blakemore, Crick, Gazzaniga)  

5.2 Memory  
(Milner, Squire and Kandel)  

5.21 Declarative and non-declarative memory  
(Milner Squire and Kandel)  

5.22 Storage, retention and memory traces  
(LeDoux, Squire and Kandel; Gazzaniga Mangun and Ivry; James, Köhler, Glynn; Bennett Gibson and Robinson, Damasio)  

CHAPTER 6    THE COGITATIVE POWERS  

6.1 Belief  
(Crick)  

6.2 Thinking
6.3 Imagination and mental images
(Blakemore, Posner and Raichle, Shepard)

6.3.1 The logical features of mental imagery
(Galton, Richardson, Kosslyn and Ochsner, Finke, Luria, Shepard, Meudell, Betts, Marks, Shepard and Metzler, Cooper and Shepard, Posner and Raichle)

CHAPTER 7 EMOTION

7.1 Affections
(Rolls, Damasio)

7.2 The emotions: a preliminary analytical survey

7.2.1 Neuroscientists’ confusions
(LeDoux, Damasio, James)

7.2.2 Analysis of the emotions

CHAPTER 8 VOLITION AND VOLUNTARY MOVEMENT

8.1 Volition

8.2 Libet’s theory of voluntary movement
(Libet, Frith et al.)

8.3 Taking stock

PART III CONSCIOUSNESS AND CONTEMPORARY NEUROSCIENCE: AN ANALYSIS

CHAPTER 9 INTRANSITIVE AND TRANSITIVE CONSCIOUSNESS

9.1 Consciousness and the brain

9.2 Intransitive consciousness
(Searle, Dennett)

9.3 Transitive consciousness and its forms

9.4 Transitive consciousness — a partial analysis
CHAPTER 10  CONSCIOUS EXPERIENCE, MENTAL STATES AND QUALIA 261

10.1 Extending the concept of consciousness 261
   (Libet, Baars, Crick, Edelman, Searle, Chalmers)

10.2 Conscious experience and conscious mental states 263

10.2.1 Confusions regarding unconscious belief and unconscious activities of the brain 268
   (Searle, Baars)

10.3 Qualia 271
   (Searle, Chalmers, Glynn, Damasio, Edelman and Tononi, Nagel, Dennett)

10.3.1 ‘How it feels’ to have an experience 274
   (Searle, Edelman and Tononi, Chalmers, Damasio)

10.3.2 Of there being something which it is like ... 277
   (Nagel)

10.3.3 The qualitative character of experience 281

10.3.4 Thises and thuses 282
   (Chalmers, Crick)

10.3.5 Of the communicability and describability of qualia 284
   (Nagel, Edelman, Glynn, Sperry)

CHAPTER 11  PUZZLES ABOUT CONSCIOUSNESS 293

11.1 A budget of puzzles 293

11.2 Reconciling consciousness or subjectivity with our conception of an objective reality 294
   (Searle, Chalmers, Dennett, Penrose)

11.3 On the question of how physical processes can give rise to conscious experience 302
   (Huxley, Tyndall, Humphrey, Glynn, Edelman, Damasio)

11.4 Of the evolutionary value of consciousness 307
   (Chalmers, Barlow, Penrose, Humphrey, Searle)

11.5 The problem of awareness 314
   (Johnson-Laird, Blakemore)

11.6 Other minds and other animals 316
   (Crick, Edelman, Weiskrantz, Baars)
CHAPTER 12  SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS  323

12.1 Self-consciousness and the self  323

12.2 Historical stage-setting: Descartes, Locke, Hume, James  324

12.3 Current scientific and neuroscientific reflections on the nature of self-consciousness  (Damasio, Edelman, Humphrey, Blakemore, Johnson-Laird)  328

12.4 The illusion of a ‘self’  (Damasio, Humphrey, Blakemore)  331

12.5 The horizon of thought, will and affection  334

12.51 Thought and language  (Damasio, Edelman and Tononi, Galton, Penrose)  337

12.6 Self-consciousness  (Edelman, Penrose)  346

PART IV ON METHOD  353

CHAPTER 13  REDUCTIONISM  355

13.1 Ontological and explanatory reductionism  (Crick, Blakemore)  355

13.2 Reduction by elimination  (P.M. and P.S. Churchland)  366

13.2.1 Are our ordinary psychological concepts theoretical?  (P.M. Churchland)  367

13.2.2 Are everyday generalizations about human psychology laws of a theory?  (P. M. Churchland)  370

13.2.3 Eliminating all that is human  (P.M. and P.S. Churchland, Dawkins)  372

13.2.4 On sawing off the branch on which one sits  376

CHAPTER 14  METHODOLOGICAL REFLECTIONS  378

14.1 Linguistic inertia and conceptual innovation  (P.S. Churchland)  379
14.2 The ‘poverty of English’ argument
(Blakemore)

14.3 From nonsense to sense: the proper description of the
results of commissurotomy
(Crick, Sperry, Gazzaniga, Wolford Miller and Gazzaniga, Doty)

14.3.1 The case of blindsight: misdescription and illusory explanation
(Weiskrantz)

14.4 Philosophy and neuroscience
(Glynn, Edelman, Edelman and Tononi, Crick, Zeki)

14.4.1 What philosophy can and what it cannot do

14.4.2 What neuroscience can and what it cannot do
(Crick, Edelman, Zeki)

14.5 Why it matters

APPENDICES

Appendix 1 Daniel Dennett
1. Dennett’s methodology and presuppositions
2. The intentional stance
3. Heterophenomenological method
4. Consciousness

Appendix 2 John Searle
1. Philosophy and science
2. Searle’s philosophy of mind
3. The traditional mind-body problem

INDEX